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In 1983, Congress enacted as part of the Social Security
Amendments of 1983 (SSA), major Medicare reforms designed to
ensure the solvency of Social Security into the 21st Century.' The
enactment and implementation of a "prospective payment system"
(PPS) for hospitals under Medicare constituted one of the most
significant, and perhaps enduring, innovations of the Reagan
Administration.2 The Prospective Payment System, which replaced the
retrospective, cost-based reimbursement system, fundamentally altered
the payment of hospital care for the elderly and disabled, and
played an integral part in the revolution of health care delivery in
America.3 The Reagan Administration's goal was to create incentives
for hospitals to operate more efficiently in order to curb rising
government expenditures on health care. The underlying agenda,
however, was to reduce the federal deficit, a political issue that
related only tangentially to health care but that has driven the
operation of PPS during the past seven years."
In her probing article, Professor Judith Lave contributes
significantly to the debate surrounding PPS by surveying the
t A.B., Case Western Reserve University, 1969; J.D., IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1973; Partner, Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein, Washington, D.C. The author served as
Director of the Bureau of Eligibility, Reimbursement and Coverage within the Health Care
Financing Administration where he had lead responsibility for the design, enactment, and
implementation of the Prospective Payment System.
tt B.A., University of Washingon. 1965; Ph.D., Economics, Washington University,
1970; Vice-President, Lewin/ICF, Washington, D.C. The author served as Director of
Research for the Health Care Financing Administration, where he was a key figure in the
design of Medicare's DRG System.
1. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Social Security Amendments, 97 Stat. 65, 149-72 (1983) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (Supp. V 1987)).
3. Under PPS, hospitals are reimbursed for each patient discharge based on diagnosis
related groups, or DRGs.
4. See Medicare Cuts Inevitable Until the Federal Budget is Balanced: Rostenkowski, AM.
HOSPITAL A'N NEws, Apr. 2, 1990, at 3, col. 3; See also U.S. DEI"T OF HFA.TH & HUMAN
SERVS., THE FISCAL YEAR 1991 BuDGET 2 (1990).
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PPS/DRG system and assessing its impact on quality of care.' She
explains briefly the development and function of the system,
compares the expected consequences of PPS with the actual impact,
and condudes that, while PPS has undoubtedly changed the delivery
of health care in America, its impact on the quality of care cannot
yet be conclusively determined. She suggests that the evidence,
although mixed, supports the conclusion that quality of care has not
been significantly affected except insofar as the diffusion of new,
more expensive technologies has been slowed. She does, however,
point out that hospitals under increasing financial pressure may be
forced to economize still further, resulting in a more noticeable
impact on quality of care. Finally, she recommends three adjustments
to the current Prospective Payment System, which she argues will
make the system more sensitive to unavoidable costs incurred by
individual institutions. Her suggestions would move PPS back to
hospital-specific reimbursement, a formula that deters the effort to
create uniform pricing incentives for hospitals. She also seemingly
does not specifically address the central issue facing the system:
chronic underpayment by Congress.
Professor Lave's article reflects a thorough and thoughtful
understanding of the issues involved, but by failing to explicitly
address revenue shortfalls, her analysis and recommendations do not
reach the heart of the problems facing PPS.' The most critical
impact of PPS has been financial, threatening the economic welfare
of the hospital industry. The incentives created by PPS have forced
efficiency and innovation in the hospital industry: more outpatient
care is being provided and the average length of stay has been
reduced.7 Since the implementation of PPS, however, the hospital
industry has suffered a steady decline in average operating margins;
currently, a projected 63.2 percent of all hospitals show a negative
operating margin.8 This deficit has been caused by Congress' low
increases in the rate of payment for hospital care under Medicare,
decisions which are fundamentally political in nature and have been
driven by the need to reduce the federal deficit. The critical concern
for PPS right now is therefore increased reimbursements for all
5. Lave, The Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System and Recommendations for
Change, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 499 (1990).
6. The editorial staff at the Yale Journal on Regulation requested that Professor Lave
focus her article on the issue of the impact of PPS on Medicare beneficiaries.
7. Lave, supra note 5, at 513-20.
8. See infra Table 3.
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hospitals, not modifications in the way those inadequate payments
are distributed.
I. Analysis of the PPS Program Impact
The Medicare system faces a financial crisis, not a crisis in the
quality of care. Since the implementation of PPS in 1983, quality of
care has shown no measurable deterioration, but hospital operating
margins for Medicare patients have declined steadily, dropping from
14.7 percent in 1983 to a predicted -6.6 percent in 1990 (See Figure
1).9 In other words, hospitals are continuing to provide high-quality
Figure 1
TREND IN CASE-WEIGHTED MEDICARE PPS
OPERATING MARGIN (ACTUAL & PROJECTED)
PPSI PPS2 PPS3 PPS4 FY88 FY89 FY90
FEDERAL FISCAL
PPS YEAR ACTUAL DATA YEA P ISYEAR PROJECTIONS
SOURCE: LEWIN/ICF PAYMENT SIMULATION MODEL (1990)
treatment for Medicare patients, but in doing so they are running
large and growing deficits. The operating deficits are a systemic
9. More recent simulation results suggest that the forecasts in Figure 1 are too low.
The new evidence indicates that margins in PPS Year 7 (FY 1990) will be -2.4%. By PPS
Year 9 (FY 1992), if PPS revenue rates of increase rise with the hospital market basket,
PPS margins will be around -7%. If the Bush budget were implemented in FY 1991, and
its payment rules extended to FY 1992, hospital margins for PPS Year 9 could be as low
as -13%. Thus, the downward trend depicted in Figure 1 still holds and is predicted to
continue at least through FY 1992.
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feature of the Medicare payment system, not an isolated problem
confined to a few hospitals or regions. A large and increasing
percentage of every type of hospital in virtually every region of the
country now experience negative operating margins for their
Medicare patients. Moreover, the average deficits have been growing
steadily in the past three years and most signs indicate that the
trend will continue.
Data from Table 1 indicate that in almost every region of the
country, the projected average operating margin for hospitals will be
negative in 1990. Only in the mid-Atlantic region are projected
operating margins still positive, but even there they have fallen from
16.5 percent in 1984 to an expected 3 percent in 1990. Further-
more, the data show that the projected average operating margins
will be negative for rural as well as urban hospitals and proprietary
as well as non-proprietary hospitals. The same will be true for
teaching as well as non-teaching hospitals. Although major teaching
facilities are expected to have a positive operating margin for 1990,
the margins will be slight and will be significantly reduced from
previous years.
Data from Table 2 reveal that all hospitals, regardless of financial
strength, have suffered significant declines in their operating margins
since 1984. Between 1984 and 1990, the median operating margin
for all hospitals has dropped from 11.15 percent to a projected
deficit of -6.63 percent. Over the same period, the 25th percentile
margin fell from 2.77 percent to a predicted -21.61 percent, which
means that 25 percent of all hospitals fare worse than this margin.
Even among the financially strongest hospitals, those above the 75th
percentile, the operating margin has fallen from 17.69 percent to a
predicted 7.01 percent.0
Finally, data from Table 3 indicate a consistent increase in the
number of hospitals operating with PPS deficits. Since 1988, when
the deficits first became widespread, the proportion of hospitals with
negative operating margins has increased from 46.1 percent to a
projected 63.2 percent. The problem is most widespread in the New
England region where currently an anticipated 78.2 percent of all
hospitals are running deficits in their Medicare programs. Even in
the West North Central region, where the problem is least severe,
more than half of all hospitals are predicted to have negative
operating margins.
10. This data mean that the richest 25% of all hospitals are expected to have
operating margins above 7.01 percent by 1990.
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Table 2
PPS MARGIN BY PERCENTILE (PPS-1 TO PPS-7)
BY URBAN/RURAL AND TEACHING STATUS













































































































Source: Lewin/ICF Payment Simulation Model (1990)
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Table 3
PROJECTED PERCENTAGE HOSPITALS WITH NEGATIVE
PPS OPERATING MARGINS
PPS PPS PPS
YEAR 5 YEAR 6 YEAR 7
ALL HOSPITALS 46.1% 51.1% 63.2%
URBAN 45.3 53.0 65.7
URBAN BEDS < 100 41.9 46.2 57.0
URBAN BEDS 100-404 47.7 56.6 69.9
URBAN BEDS 405-685 38.5 48.2 63.2
URBAN BEDS > 685 45.9 51.4 56.8
RURAL 46.9 49.0 60.5
RURAL BEDS < 100 45.0 46.5 57.7
RURAL BEDS 100-169 54.7 58.6 73.0
RURAL BEDS > 170 54.0 60.9 71.4
TEACHING - ALL 43.5 52.1 65.7
TEACHING - MAJOR 25.6 31.1 44.5
TEACHING - MINOR 47.3 56.5 70.1
NON-TEACHING 46.6 50.9 62.7
NEW ENDLAND 61.4 68.2 78.2
MID-ATLANTIC 33.7 38.0 53.5
SO. ATLANTIC 55.4 61.3 71.3
E. N. CENTRAL 49.6 56.5 73.5
E. S. CENTRAL 38.5 43.6 53.8
W. N. CENTRAL 37.7 39.7 52.5
W. S. CENTRAL 50.3 55.6 66.8
MOUNTAIN 45.2 48.2 59.8
PACIFIC 44.1 50.1 58.6
CHURCH 44.9 51.7 65.3
VOLUNTARY 45.2 50.1 63.6
PROPRIETARY 48.9 55.3 63.7
GOVERNMENT 45.8 49.3 61.1
Source: Lewin/ICF Payment Simulation Model (1990)
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The falling average PPS operating margins are, of course,
explained by the fact that PPS case revenues are rising less rapidly
than PPS case costs. For instance, during the first six years of PPS,
case revenues rose by about 35 percent while PPS case costs rose by
about 60 percent." The ultimate cause of the operating deficits,
however, lies in Congressional unwillingness to provide adequate
funding to the Medicare system. Rather than rising each year to
reflect increases in inflation or in hospitals' average costs,
reimbursement levels have been determined by political
considerations-mainly by Congress' desire to reduce the budget
deficit.'2 As a result, annual increases in reimbursement levels have
lagged behind increases in hospitals' cost of treating patients.
This severe financial pressure shows no signs of abating.
Hospitals, like all private institutions, cannot run financial deficits
indefinitely: sooner or later, the financial pressure will force some
hospitals to close and others to curtail dramatically their services to
the public. The most important question the PPS program raises is
how to reverse the trend in hospital finances and to restore positive
operating margins.
In our view, the problem is primarily a political one, and
therefore cannot be adequately addressed by making adjustments to
the PPS regulations. The shortfall in hospital revenues can be
explained by the severe budget constraints faced by the Congress
due to the continuing federal budget deficit. As long as the deficit
persists, and as long as Congress' spending priorities remain as they
are, it is unlikely that Congress will be willing to provide an overall
level of Medicare support that is adequate to meet the expenses
generated by the PPS system.
11. These numbers are internal calculations based on information in the PROPAC
Report to Congress (June 1989).
12. See, e.g., The Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9101, 100 Stat. 151 (1985) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
1395ww (Supp. V 1987)). These Amendments froze the 1985 rates in place through April
30, 1986 and then granted only a one-half of one percent increase for the remainder of
Federal FY 1986 (i.e., through October 1, 1986). This in turn was followed by the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9302(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 1982
(1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (Supp. V 1987)), which granted a mere
1.15% increase for Federal FY 1987. Congress has imposed further limits in the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, §
107, 1987 U.S.CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (101 Stat.) 754, 782 (imposing a temporary
freeze); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4001-02, 101
Stat. 1330-42, 1330-42-1330-46 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (Supp. V
1987)); and the Ommbus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §
6003(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2140 (1989) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww).
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II. Medicare Payment Systems: Another Perspective
Professor Lave correctly identifies the problem with PPS when she
notes that the financial condition of all hospitals has deteriorated in
recent years. From this finding, she makes three recommendations
for change: 1) rates for PPS should be "rebased" using the most
current data, 2) the rates should be reformulated to include a 25
percent hospital-specific component, and 3) the payment formula
should also include a new index to adjust for non-labor costs across
geographical areas."3 When taken together, Lave's recommendations
are actually intended to replace PPS' national standard with a
hospital-specific rate of reimbursement. Such a proposal represents
a return to cost-based reimbursement that runs counter to the price
incentives put in place by PPS. If implemented on a budget-neutral
basis, it will act merely as a device to redistribute current payments.
Lave's recommendations can best be understood in the context of
the national debate over the implementation of PPS. The 1983 Social
Security Amendments that authorized the prospective payment
system anticipated that by the end of fiscal year (FY) 1986 there
would be a national schedule of PPS/DRG rates. 4 Under the national
standard, the only differences between the basic rate payments made
by Medicare to various hospitals for a given diagnosis were to be
determined by whether the hospital was urban or rural, 5 by the
relative wage rate in its locality, 6 and by its status as a teaching
hospital. 7 The basic PPS/DRG rates and these adjustment factors
were to be revised periodically by the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) under the auspices of the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) after consultation with the newly
created Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (PROPAC).
Prior to the end of FY 1986, however, Congress extended the
period of transition to the completely nationalized standard,
preserving the temporary partial reimbursement based on actual
historical costs.'9 In addition, the standardized "national" portion of
13. Lave, supra note 5, at 525-27.
14. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601(e), 97 Stat. 65,
152-153 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1987)). The Act
anticipated a gradual phase-in of the national standard during which a portion of the
hospitals' reimbursement would continue to be based on actual costs.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3)(E) (Supp. V 1987).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(e)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
19. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9102, 100 Stat. 151 (1986)(Supp. V 1987).
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the rates used during this period was actually a blend of national
rates and separately determined regional PPS/DRG rates, reflecting
cost differentials in different parts of the country." It was not until
FY 1988 that the system finally phased out the use of historical costs
as a portion of reimbursement.21 The use of regional PPS/DRG rates
remains in effect (at a 15 percent weighting factor) for some areas
of the country."
The delay in effectuating this transition was in part caused by the
heated battles that have raged within the Congress, as well as
between the Congress and the Administration since the
implementation of the PPS/DRG scheme.2 The battles have ranged
from debates over the appropriateness of various DRG categories to
arguments concerning the accuracy of various inflation and
adjustment factors. At the center of the political debate has been
controversy over whether or not the country should adopt a single
national rate for Medicare reimbursement. In our opinion, this
controversy has been fueled more by geographical considerations
than by ideological fervor. Because of internal disagreement, the
timetable for the phase-out of regional rates and hospital-specific
costs and the complete adoption of a national PPS/DRG rate was
repeatedly delayed and complicated.
This move to a national rate for PPS/DRG determinations is
exactly what Lave contests in her article. In her conclusion, she
explicitly states, "that the national rate now in effect under PPS does
not adequately adjust for the factors that influence the level of costs
in specific hospitals .... ,24 Her recommendations are thus designed
to make the PPS reimbursement scheme "more sensitive to the costs
of individual institutions. '25 Lave's first proposal for improving the
system is to make the national PPS/DRG reimbursement rates more
current. She suggests that data on actual costs per case for individual
hospitals should be calculated for the most recent time period
(presumably FY 1990) and established as the new basis for future
payment schedules.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1987).
21. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1987), amended by
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4002(d), 101 Stat.
1330. 1330-44 (1987).
22. This provision sunsets on September 30, 1990. Id.
23. See G. ANNAS, S. LAw, R. ROSENBLATF & K. WING, AMERICAN HEALTH LAW,
239-48 (1990).
24. Lave, supra note 5, at 528.
25. Id.
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Perhaps the best way to understand this recommendation is by
assessing its effects in a particular example.26 For instance, in FY
1990 a payment to Memorial Hospital, a non-teaching, "large" urban
institution (i.e., located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area [MSA]
greater than 1 million in population), for DRG "X" with a weight of
1.0 would be computed in the following manner:
DRG standardized amount in round terms for FY 1990, for
"large" urban hospitals:
1. labor component: $2508
2. non-labor component: $888
3. Memorial Hospital's area wage index: 1.100
The labor component of the DRG standardized amount is adjusted
for the area wage index: $2508 x 1.1 = $2759. The total adjusted
standardized amount is $2759 + $888 = $3647. The total adjusted
standardized amount is multiplied by the DRG weighing factor for
the particular diagnosis: $3647 x 1.000 = $ 3647. The hospital will
receive $3647 as the PPS/DRG payment for the patient."
As Lave notes, the first two factors of this formula (the labor and
non-labor components) are currently based on actual cost data from
1981 which have been trended forward to 1984 and increased on an
annual basis in the course of Congressional budget determinations.
Lave calls for these figures to be recalculated for the most recent
fiscal year so that they more accurately reflect a hospital's actual
costs. 28 Clearly, she expects that the new figures will be higher than
the ones presently reimbursed by Congress because she explains that
the new rates will "accommodate" for the increase in hospital costs
that has occurred in recent PPS years.
The problem with this recommendation is that Lave does not
explicitly state that Congress would have to allow more funds than
26. For the purposes of this hypothetical, the labor component and the non-labor
component are taken from the national adjusted standardized rates set by HCFA. See
Medicare Program" Legislative Changes Concerning Paymen to Hlospitals for Federal Fiscal Year
1990, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,753 (1989). We assume for this example that Memorial Hospital is
located in an area in which the area wage index is 1.1.
'27. In addition, the hospital will be reimbursed for other expenditures, such as capital
costs, "outliers", the direct costs of medical education, and service to a disproportionate
number of low income patients. G. ANNAS, supra note 22, at 241, 245-46.
28. It should be noted that the DRG weighting factors and the regional wage indices
are updated periodically. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (d)(4)(C) (Supp. V 1987) (DRG weighting
factors updated at least annually); 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (d)(3)(E) (Supp. V 1987) (regional wage
indices updated at least every 36 months).
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it has historically provided to Medicare in order to cover these newly
calculated costs. In fact, Lave makes no mention whatsoever of
infusing more dollars, in the aggregate, into the system. If she does
not intend this and instead expects the system to operate on a
"budget neutral" basis, with no new dollars to Medicare, then the
purpose of her rebasing is a mystery. While it would create a more
accurate pool of cost figures, the rebasing effort will be futile if the
calculated amounts are then trended forward based on policy
determinations, as has been the practice in the past, rather than the
inflation rate.
Lave's most significant proposal for change lies in her
recommendation to include a hospital-specific component in the PPS
rate. She suggests devising a rate that gives 75 percent weight to the
national rate and 25 percent weight to the hospital's specific costs. 9
Ostensibly, this new rate would account for "those unmeasured
factors that influence hospitals' costs.""0 Lave's lack of specificity
about these factors makes it difficult to assess whether or not the
system should consider reimbursing them. It may be that some of
the factors that cause one hospital to have higher costs than another
are precisely those efficiency-related ones within a hospital's control.
For example, in another of Lave's articles criticizing the national
rate, she states that institutional expenses may vary based on such
factors as "regional patterns in length of stay" and "less quantifiable
variables including physician and consumer tastes."'" This kind of
variation across the country is exactly what implementation of a
national standard aims to reduce. As such, Lave's recommendations
to reimburse partly on a hospital's actual historical costs would create
the very kinds of incentives for inefficiency that the PPS/DRG system
was designed to overcome.
Referring again to the example above, the implementation of
Lave's proposal would mean that each hospital would be reimbursed
based on a factor that was 75 percent determined by the national
average and 25 percent determined by its incurred costs in a recent
period. Even partial reimbursement on a hospital-specific basis would
result in a highly redistributional payment scheme. Those hospitals
that have been successful in holding down costs would be locked
into a reduced payment. Conversely, those hospitals whose costs have
increased at a rate greater than the year-to-year increases in
29. Lave, supra note 5, at 526.
30. Id.
31. Lave, Hospital Reimburement Under Medicare, 62 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 251, 254
(1984).
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payment would be awarded a more generous payment based on
their recent operating expenses.
The same dynamic would occur in relation to hospitals
differentiated by volume of patients. Those hospitals which have
experienced constant or increased inpatient utilization might be
penalized, while hospitals whose occupancy has decreased would be
rewarded in the future due to their present high costs per case.
Such a reversal of financial incentives would send a very ambiguous
signal to the hospital industry.
Finally, Lave proposes to increase the number of adjustment
factors that PPS figures into its payment formula. Lave notes that
PPS currently recognizes geographical differences in labor costs. In
the above example, the area wage index factor adjusts the standard
labor component to account for regional variations. What Lave
presumably calls for is a new non-labor index, covering such costs
as food, gas, electricity, and oil, to be calculated for similar
geographical regions and figured into the standardized PPS/DRG
payment. This adjustment factor would be multiplied by the non-
labor component (element #2) in the example.
As with Lave's hospital-specific rate, implementation of this
proposal would be explicitly redistributional. For example, if the
system adjusted for national variation in gas prices, hospitals in those
areas where gas is relatively expensive, such as the industrial
Northeast, would be allotted increased federal funds while other
hospitals, such as those in Texas, would be penalized simply because
they are located in areas where gas is relatively inexpensive.
Lave's proposal is also problematic because it unreasonably
assumes that there is not a national market for any item purchased
by hospitals. To justify this, Lave should at minimum offer evidence
that substantial geographical variation exists for items such as
supplies, food, and drugs. Moreover, Lave fails to note that the vast
majority of hospitals now belong to huge cooperatives called group
purchasing organizations [GPOs] that negotiate national or super-
regional contracts for such items from the large corporate vendors
who sell them."
Finally, any proposal to increase the number of adjustment factors
will necessarily be a proxy. The unhappy history of the wage index
adjustor calls into question the efficacy of a proxy. First, the creation
of the data base will be suspect, even if it is hospital data. Second,
32. See Healthweek, Apr. 4, 1990, at 27, for a list of the fourteen largest hospital
alliances.
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the weighting of data such as the costs of heating versus air
conditioning is problematic. Third, arithmetic errors are highly likely.
All three of Lave's recommendations move the PPS/DRG system
to a regime more sensitive to the specific costs of an individual
hospital. Her departure from a national standard would be
deleterious for the PPS/DRG system because it would reinstitute a
highly confounding variable. Furthermore, her proposals do not
sufficiently address the overarching financial crises that afflicts most,
not just some hospitals. At best, what Lave proposes is a stop-gap
measure to subsidize those institutions with the worst operating
margins. Clearly, a greater level of reimbursement is required across
the board.
Conclusion
The Prospective Payment System has been in place for almost
seven years, yet it still generates considerable controversy and debate.
The lessons of those seven years have been mixed, and in some
respects difficult to decipher. Many of the actual consequences,
particularly those financial in nature, have been unintended and
unanticipated, running counter to the incentives built into PPS.
Further, some of the most feared impacts, such as those affecting
quality of care, have not resulted from the reforms. With costs
continuing to climb in spite of intense financial pressure on hospitals
to economize, many critics point to the failure of PPS to control
inefficiencies. Others argue that additional factors unrelated to
hospital efficiency have contributed to rising costs rather than an
inherent defect in PPS. Despite the competing arguments and
speculation, PPS has for the most part proved to be a success. The
development of PPS as originally created, however, has been
thwarted by Congressional manipulation and chronic underfunding
of the program.
Although initial concerns about PPS focused on quality of care, as
Lave's article points out, surprisingly few of those fears have been
realized. The most significant impacts of the reforms have been
financial in nature. As we have argued, PPS has succeeded in
creating the incentives to reduce costs. In fact, PPS has saved the
Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund 18 billion in 1990 dollars
in spite of rapidly rising costs.s The system, however, has been
33. L. Russel & C. Manning, The Effet of Prospective Payment on Medicare Expenditures,
320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 439, 441 (1989).
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subjected to political pressures which are gradually undermining the
carefully structured program. Responding to constituent special
interests, Congress has made significant changes to PPS, particularly
in budget reconciliation bills." Because hospitals located within
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) receive more money on a per-
case basis than do providers outside of MSAs, Congress has often
chosen to change the boundaries of particular MSAs to provide for
increased reimbursement for certain hospitals. 5 Responding to
competing budgetary pressures, Congress has not increased PPS
revenues commensurate with either the inflation rate or the rising
costs of goods and services used by the hospital industry in the
delivery of health care. The legislated increase in PPS revenues has
fallen far short of the actual increases in costs of care; consequently,
the entire hospital industry has shown a significant deficit in their
operating margins during the last two years.
This problem is the most critical one facing PPS. Congress is
essentially developing a piece-meal health care policy based upon
yearly budgetary constraints by consistently creating budget shortfalls
for the hospital industry. Hospitals cannot continue to operate at a
loss; eventually they will be forced to limit services, close
departments or wings, or maybe shut down altogether. As a
consequence important policy decisions, such as those concerning
access to care and development of new technologies, will be made
not by Congress or DHHS, but rather by individual hospitals in
response to continuing financial crisis. A rational long-term program
for the provision of hospital care under Medicare requires consistent
funding which represents, to some extent, the legitimate cost of care.
As it now stands, PPS funding simply represents the priority of
health care relative to Congress's other budgetary demands.
The answer to the problem at this point does not lie entirely in
the redistribution of Congressional outlays, as Professor Lave
recommends; rather, the solution lies in across-the-board increases
34. See, e.g.. Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369. 98 Stat. 1061, 1061-1103 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. V 1987)); Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation
Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 151, 151-201 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. V 1987)); Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874, 1980-2049 (1986) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. V 1987)); Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2137-2258 (1989) (to be
codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1395).
35. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §
4005, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-47-1330-48 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww
(Supp. V 1987)).
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in payment to cover, at a minimum, yearly increases in the rate of
inflation. Professor Lave's recommendations, without an aggregate
increase in funding, provide a solution much like those already
adopted by Congress. They will transfer an inadequate amount of
money from one hospital to another and complicate the
administration of PPS by making the reimbursement formulas more
hospital specific. Moreover, her recommendations, unless very
carefully designed and implemented, would reward hospitals for
their inefficiency and recreate some of the incentives that PPS sought
to abolish.
